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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF UTAHr
Appellee,
Case No. 910494

vs.
STEVEN DOUGLAS THURMAN,
Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This interlocutory appeal is from a Memorandum Decision
and Order denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence.
court obtains jurisdiction pursuant

This

to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-

2(3)(h).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
POINT I
All evidence obtained as a result of the illegal entry
must be suppressed.

The unauthorized no-knock entry violated Utah

Code Ann. §77-23-10. The officers who executed the search warrant
failed to give notice of authority before entry into Thurman's
apartment.

The warrant did not authorize a no-knock entry.
POINT II

The officers did not lawfully obtain defendant's consent
to search

following

the

consent was not voluntary.
exploitation of prior

initial police conduct.

Defendant's

The consent to search was obtained by

illegal police conduct and all evidence

2
resulting from it must be suppressed.

The standard of review for

a trial court's finding of consent is that a finding shall not be
set aside unless it is clearly erroneous.

State v. Arroyo, 796

P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), citing Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a).
POINT III
The warrant is not supported by probable cause due to the
staleness of information in the warrant application.
mation

regarding

Thurman's motive and

opportunity

All inforare

events

occurring several months prior to the criminal incident.

The

standard of review is one of great deference to the magistrate's
decision.

State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1987).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-10 (1953, as amended)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant is charged with one capital homicide and two

related felonies in the death of Adam Cook.

Defendant filed a

motion to suppress all evidence found in a search of his apartment
and storage unit. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing
on August 28, 1991.

The Honorable Michael R. Murphy denied the

motion on October 9, 1991. This court granted defendant's petition
to file an interlocutory appeal on November 5, 1991.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On May 15, 1991, at 9:35 p.m. a bomb exploded in his
father's car and fatally wounded Adam Cook (Evidentiary Hearing
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Transcript, 8-28-91, p. 28). On May 16, 1991, at 11:17 p.m., U.S.
Magistrate Ronald Boyce issued a search warrant for Thurman's
apartment and a 1975 Chevrolet Monza (T. 28).

Despite a request

in the warrant application, Judge Boyce did not grant a nighttime
search or no-knock entry (T. 15-16, 29). The affidavit of Roderic
J. Conner, a special agent with the Federal Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), was the basis for probable cause for
the warrant (Addendum 2).
The warrant affidavit included five basic allegations.
First, Howard Cook, the victim's father, alleged that Thurman
wanted to harm him because he was having an affair with Thurman's
former wife, Wendy Thurman (Addendum 2, p. 3).

He also alleged

that Thurman drove an early 1980's light colored Monza (Addendum
2, p. 3). Second, Wendy Thurman, defendant's former wife, stated
that Thurman would not talk to her after their divorce several
months earlier but had not made any threats against her (Addendum
2, p. 3).

She also stated that Thurman had waited outside her

apartment and watched her return from a date with Howard Cook
several months earlier (Addendum 2, p. 3). Third, Linda Mae Bird,
Wendy Thurman's aunt, stated that Thurman called her six months
earlier and told her he had hired a private investigator to watch
Howard and Wendy (Addendum 2, p. 4). She alleged that Thurman was
"extremely angry" at Wendy because of the divorce and that he hates
Wendy for it (Addendum 2, p. 4).

Fourth, Diane Burbidge, a

resident in the blast vicinity, saw a small two-door vehicle with
no lights speeding from the area (Addendum 2, p. 4). Fifth, on May

4
14, 1991, Howard Cook's and Wendy Thurman1s employer received a
call from a male who said that a bomb was in the back of one of the
trucks.

After a search, Salt Lake County deputies found no bomb

(Addendum 2, p. 2).
On May 17, 1991, six law enforcement officers from ATF
and Murray City Police forced open Thurman5s apartment door with
a ramming device at 6:14 a.m. (T. 32).

The officers did not

announce their identity or give Thurman an opportunity to respond
before they rammed the door (T. 52-53, 71). At the time of entry,
Thurman was sleeping in his bedroom (T. 72, 80).

The officers

immediately handcuffed Thurman (T. 32). While being handcuffed,
Thurman did not resist, but he did hit his nose on the bed and it
began bleeding (T. 81). ATF Special Agent Swehla informed Thurman
of his Miranda rights and placed the search warrant in his lap (T.
54).
At the time of the officers' entry, Thurman was naked and
was not allowed to dress for one hour (T. 54, 72, 84). During that
time, Thurman was handcuffed

in front (T. 54).

At 7:30

a.m.

Thurman signed two consents to search a cab-over camper, a 1975
Chevrolet Monza and a 1973 Toyota Landcruiser (T. 58, 62). Between
7:30 and 7:45 a.m., ATF Special Agent Taylor asked Thurman about
a pay envelope found in the kitchen (T. 83). Thurman answered that
it was a pay envelope for his storage unit (T. 82). Thurman kept
this envelope in his kitchen in a bill and key holder (T. 82). The
officers did not know about the storage unit before 7:30 a.m. (T.
86).
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At 7:40 a.m. an officer asked Thurman to sign a consent
to search his storage unit (T. 63-64).

When Thurman hesitated,

Special Agent Taylor stated, "We are going to get these anyway,"
(T. 83). Thurman signed the consent at that time (T. 83). During
this time, Thurman remained handcuffed in front (T. 17). At least
six agents were searching Thurman1s small 650-square-foot apartment
(T. 72).
At 11 a.m. an officer removed Thurman1s handcuffs, and
Thurman accompanied the officers to his storage unit (T. 18). Upon
arrival, Thurman opened the combination lock to the unit (T. 18).
After the agents opened the door, Thurman signed a second consent
to search the storage unit at 11:29 a.m. (T. 18).
Immediately thereafter, Thurman accompanied the agents
to his apartment to retrieve keys to a truck inside the storage
unit (T. 22). Thurman was handcuffed at that time (T. 22). They
returned to the storage unit and the officers searched the unit (T.
23).

During this search, Agent Swehla escorted Thurman to the

police mobile command unit and interrogated him (T. 66).
Thurman was arrested at 2:30 p.m. (T. 38).

Except for

a short period of time, Thurman was handcuffed from 6:17 a.m. to
2:30 p.m. (T. 38).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The officers executed a no-knock entry in violation

of Utah Code Ann. §77-23-10(2).
no-knock warrant.
entry.

The magistrate did not direct a

No exigent circumstances required a no-knock

No-knock statutes are grounded in the Fourth Amendment.
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The

officers1

entry

violated

defendant's

substantive

Fourth

Amendment rights. Therefore, the court must suppress all evidence
from the search.
2.
must

not

To be admissible, the consent must be voluntary and

be

illegality.

obtained

by

police

exploitation

of

the

prior

Because defendant was subject to a forced entry, was

handcuffed for six hours and subject to subtle police action,
defendant's consent is not voluntary.

The officers obtained the

consent after discovering the existence of the storage unit in the
search after the unlawful conduct.

Therefore, the consent is

inadmissible.
3.

The

warrant

application

was

based

on

stale

information which undermines the probable cause for the warrant.
The stale information concerns the defendant's actions several
months prior to the warrant.

The alleged facts in the affidavit

are not sufficiently related in time to the issue of the warrant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ALL EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE
OFFICERS' ILLEGAL ENTRY MUST BE SUPPRESSED.
A.

THE OFFICERS' ENTRY VIOLATED UTAH CODE ANN. §77-23-10.
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-10(2) (1953, as amended), allows

an officer executing a search warrant to enter without notice of
his authority and purpose only if the magistrate

issuing the

warrant directs so in the warrant.
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-10 - Force used in executing warrant - Notice
of authority prerequisite, when.
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When a search warrant has been issued
authorizing entry into any building, room,
conveyance, compartment or other enclosure, the
officer executing the warrant may use such
force as is reasonably necessary to enter:
* * *

(2)
Without notice of his authority and
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the warrant
directs in the warrant that the officer need
not give notice, the magistrate shall so direct
only upon proof under oath, that the object of
the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed
of, or secreted, or that physical harm may
result to any person if notice were given.
(Emphasis added.)
In State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988), this court
held that Utah Code Ann. §77-23-10 contemplated that absent noknock authority or exigent circumstances, an officer should knock
and announce his authority.
protect

three basic

Knock

interests:

and announce

(1) an

requirements

individual's

private

activities in his home; (2) both police and occupants from any
violence or injury resulting from unannounced police entry; and (3)
property from any damage resulting from the forced entry (I_d. at
701).
Here, the agents requested no-knock authorization in the
warrant pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-23-10. Judge Boyce did not
authorize a "no-knock" entry and additionally restricted the search
to day time hours.

Yet, the officers executed a no-knock entry.

Agent Swehla, the entry team leader, admitted that a ramming device
was used on Thurman's door (T. 52-53).

He also admitted that the

entry and the announcement were made simultaneously (T. 53). The
trial court found that the officers executed the warrant as a no-
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knock warrant even though Judge Boyce did not authorize a forced
entry.
Absent no-knock warrant authority, the State must show
that exigent circumstances existed which necessitated the officers1
no-knock entry, State v. Buck, 756 P.2d at 702.

Not only did the

warrant not direct a no-knock entry, no exigent circumstances
existed to require such an entry.

Thurman was not considered

dangerous and, unlike narcotic cases, no likelihood existed that
the evidence could be quickly destroyed. Neither the State nor the
participating officers, in their testimonies, contend that evidence
could quickly be destroyed if notice had been given.
Therefore, the officers had no legal authority, not by
warrant or circumstances, to execute a no-knock entry.

Such an

entry is unlawful.
B.
VIOLATION OF NO-KNOCK
EVIDENCE.

STATUTE RESULTS

IN SUPPRESSION OF

Since the officers1 no-knock entry violated knock and
announce rules, the most appropriate remedy is the suppression of
the evidence, United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198, 202 (10th Cir.
1980).
In State v. Buck, supra, this court refused to suppress
the evidence obtained in an unauthorized no-knock entry and search.
That case did not justify suppression because the no-knock occurred
when no one was present who could respond to the officers1 demand.
The court also reasoned that it did not violate Thurman1s Fourth
Amendment rights since he was not home and the manner of entry had
no effect on the extent of the individual's invasion of privacy,

9
State v. Buck, at 703.

However, unlike Buck, Thurman was home at

the time of the entry.
In State v. Rowe, 806 P. 2d 730, 738 (Utah App. 1991), the
court stated

that a violation of a statute which establishes

procedure to protect substantive rights cannot be dismissed as
technical or minuscule and suppression of the evidence gained from
the challenged searched is the appropriate remedy.
Even though the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on this
issue

in particular, some jurisdictions, including

the Tenth

Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that no-knock statutes are
clearly grounded

in the

Fourth

Amendment

protections

of the

sanctity of the home. See, United States v. Ruminer, 786 F.2d 381
(10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824 (9th
Cir. 1979); cert, denied 441 U.S. 965, S.Ct. 2415,60 L.Ed.2d 1071
(1079); State v. Rauch, 586 P.2d 671

(Idaho 1978); People v.

Gifford, 782 P.2d 795 (Colo. 1989); People v. Ramey, 16 Cal.3d 263,
127 Cal.Rptr. 699, 545 P.2d 1333 (1976).
Other courts have not gone as far as a Fourth Amendment
claim but do state that a knock and announce violation is serious
enough

that

all

evidence

seized

during

the

search must

be

suppressed, United States v. Dicesare, 765 F.2d 890 (9th Cir.
amended on other grounds, 1985); State v. Rauch, 586 P.2d 671
(Idaho 1978); Greven v. Super. Ct. of County of Santa Clara, 71
Cal.2d 287, 78 Cal.Rptr. 504, 455 P.2d 432 (1969).
It is clear in the 10th Circuit that knock and announce
rules encompass substantive rights that rise to a constitutional

10
level.
rights.

Utah Code Ann. §77-10-3 was enacted

to protect those

According to Rowe, violation of those rights must be

remedied by suppression.
The trial court agreed that the officers' no-knock entry
was unlawful and that any evidence found in the apartment must be
suppressed.

However, the court went on to say that no relevant

evidence was obtained in the apartment and therefore no evidence
exists to suppress. The court overlooked that the pay envelope to
Thurman's storage unit was found.

Without knowledge of that

storage unit, the officers would not have searched the unit, a
search that resulted in some physical evidence.
Therefore, all evidence found as a result of the original
discovery of the pay envelope must be suppressed.
POINT II
THE CONSENT TO SEARCH WAS NOT LAWFULLY OBTAINED
FOLLOWING THE INITIAL POLICE CONDUCT.
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 784 (Utah 1990), sets out two
factors that determine whether the consent was lawfully obtained
following initial police misconduct. The consent must be voluntary
and it must not be obtained by police exploitation of the prior
illegality.
h.

THURMAN'S CONSENT WAS NOT VOLUNTARY.
An involuntary consent is invalid, State v. Valdez, 748

P.2d 1050 (Utah 1987).

The State has the burden of to prove that

the consent was voluntary, State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah
App. 1990).

The court must "indulge every reasonable presumption

against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there
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must be convincing evidence that such rights were waived/'

Id.

The trial court concluded that the State had met that burden by
showing clear and convincing evidence that both consents to search
the storage unit were knowingly and voluntarily granted.
However, Thurman's circumstance included many factors the
courts recognize as indicating voluntariness or the lack thereof.
The court must not only examine police conduct, but also it must
examine the characteristics of the accused, State v. Robinson, 797
P.2d 431, 437 (Utah App. 1990).
The initial events of the morning of the search could
only have left Thurman in a vulnerable subjective state, Robinson,
797 P.2d at 437.

Thurman was awakened at 6:14 a.m. by six law

enforcement officers breaking down his door with guns drawn and
yelling simultaneously.

The officers raced into Thurman's bedroom

grabbed him by the back of the hair and banged his nose against the
bed in an attempt to "secure" him.

He was handcuffed when Agent

Swehla handed him a search warrant and informed him of his rights,
State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980) (officers
exhibited force). Any individual would be confused and disoriented
if awakened in such a manner, State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437
(Utah App. 1990) (vulnerable subjective state of mind of consenting
individual).
During this period of time, Thurman was naked for up to
one hour.

At least six officers were searching the 650-square-

foot apartment.

Except

for a short period

of time, Thurman

remained handcuffed until the time of his arrest at 2:30 p.m.
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Because Thurman was handcuffed for such a long time, the detention
included some indicia of arrest/ another relevant factorf State v.
Kelly/ 718 P.2d 385/ 391 (Utah 1986) (indicia of arrest includes
handcuffs, forced entry with guns drawn and lengthy interrogation);
State v, Webb/ 790 P.2d 65/ 83 (Utah App. 1990).
When he signed

the

first consent/ Thurman had

handcuffed for at least one hour.

been

When he signed the second

consent/ he had been handcuffed for five hours,

Thurman also

testified that when he hesitated to sign the first consent/ Special
Agent Taylor said/ "We are going to get these anyway."

Agent

Swehla testified that he did not hear or see anyone make that
remark.

The trial court found that the remark was made but that

Agent Swehla did not make it.
Agent Taylorfs indication that issuance of the warrant
was inevitable vitiates consent if the probable cause required for
such a warrant was anything less than ironclad/ State v. BobO/ 803
P.2d 1268/ 1274 (Utah App. 1990) n. 7. At that time in the search/
the officers had found no evidence of criminal conduct.

Since

probable cause for the original warrant was weak/ if not nonexistent (see discussion, infraf Point III)/ probable cause for
further search would also be suspect.

Agent Taylor's claim of

authority to search is a factor listed in State v. Whittenback/ 621
P.2d 103/ 106 (Utah 1980).
Thurman testified that when he signed the first consent/
he felt shaken up and intimidated.

Even Agent conner testified

that the agents maintained control of the scene.
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The totality of all these factors adds up to a subtly
coercive situation in which Thurman's consent was involuntary.
Because the consent was involuntary, all evidence obtained as a
result of the consent must be suppressed,
B.
THE CONSENT, VOLUNTARY OR NOT, WAS OBTAINED
EXPLOITATION OF THE PRIOR ILLEGALITY.

BY POLICE

Illegal police conduct cannot be cleansed

by merely

obtaining consent after the illegality occurs, State v. Arroyo, 796
P.2d 784 (Utah 1990).

The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine can

invalidate otherwise voluntary consents, J[d. at 690, citing Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441
(1963). Wong Sun held that the trial court must determine whether
the evidence has been obtained by exploitation of the illegality
or by other means which are sufficiently distinguishable to purge
the primary taint, Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488.
Here, the trial court held that "the circumstances and
passage of time from the entry to the first consent and the entry
to the second consent purged each of the consents from the taint
of the unauthorized no-knock entry."

The court continued that the

officers did nothing to relate back to the entry and did not use
any further unnecessary show of force not otherwise implicit by
their presence.

The passage of time proved

to be the best

antiseptic, cleansing the second consent from any taint of the
illegal entry.
However, the amount of time does not cleanse the taint
and the situation becomes more coercive as time passes. During the
time between entry and the consents, Thurman was not free to move
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about but was handcuffed and under the control of the officers.
As time progressed, Thurman was subject

to continuing

police

interrogation, pressure to cooperate in the search of the units and
subject to the influence of several officers. In that time Thurman
was told the search would occur regardless of his consent and he
witnessed

several

strangers with

significant authority

through his most personal possessions.
Thurman

was

continually

restrained

search

During those six hours,

and

continually

detained,

Because of the nature of his detainment, no amount of time can
cleanse the illegal taint.
POINT III
STALE INFORMATION IN THE WARRANT APPLICATION
UNDERMINES THE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE WARRANT.
Search warrant affidavits must be construed in a common
sense reasonable manner, State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah
1987).
facts

An affidavit supporting a warrant must contain "specific
sufficient

to

support a determination

by an

impartial

magistrate that probable cause exists," State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d
987, 990 (Utah 1989). Probable cause requires a determination that
a fair probability exists that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in the area covered by the search warrant, State v.
Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah App. 1989).
In this case an affidavit supported the search warrant.
It alleged that Thurman hated the victim's father Howard Cook
because he was having an extramarital affair with Wendy Thurman,
his former wife, before they were divorced.

It was also based on

statements made by Linda Mae Bird, Wendy Thurman1s aunt, and Wendy
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Thurman.

Both alleged events regarding Thurman occurred several

months prior to the bombing.

A neighbor in the bomb area alleged

she saw a small two-door vehicle speed from the area with no
lights.

On May 14, 1991, a male called Howard Cook's employer to

say that a bomb was in one of the trucks, but Salt Lake County
Sheriff's deputies found no bomb.
None of these allegations point to Thurman. Most of the
events

involving

Thurman

occurred

several

months

earlier.

Construed as a whole, these allegations are not specific facts
sufficient to allege probable cause.

In fact, the passage of time

alone affects the probable cause.
Where the affidavit recites a mere isolated
violation, it would be unreasonable to imply
that probably cause dwindles rather quickly
with the passage of time.
State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah App. 1989), quoting
United States v. Johnsen, 461 F.2d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 1972)
(emphasis added).
The trial court held

that even

though much of the

information in the supporting affidavit occurred months before,
these allegations were proposed to suggest that Thurman had motive
and opportunity to commit the crime. The court explained that most
of the cases addressing the question of staleness approach it from
the perspective of whether there is a sufficient showing that the
evidence can still be located at the site to be searched.
In Srgo v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that a reissued search warrant based upon a previous expired
warrant was unlawful.

The court reasoned:
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While the statute does not fix the time within
which proof of probable cause must be taken by
the judge or commission, it is manifest that
the proof must be of facts so closely related
to the time of issue of the warrant as to
justify a finding of probable cause at that
time.
Srgo v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 53 S.Ct. 138, 77 L.Ed.2d 260
(1932).
In this case, the alleged facts in the affidavit occur
some months prior to the warrant.

The affidavit does not allege

that Thurman's actions and attitudes were the same at the time of
bombing as they were in the alleged attitudes in the affidavit.
Little distinction exists between whether the evidence is still at
the location or if it was ever at the location.

Both kinds of

facts must still be sufficiently related in time in order for them
to provide a basis for probable cause.
CONCLUSION
The

officers

illegally

executed

a

no-knock

entry.

Because the entry violated Thurman's substantive Fourth Amendment
rights to freedom from unreasonable searches, all evidence obtained
in the search must be suppressed.

The most notable piece of

evidence obtained from the search is a pay envelope to Thurman's
storage unit. Based upon this pay envelope, the officers obtained
consent, albeit an involuntary one, to search the storage unit.
This consent was tainted by the unlawful entry.
events cleanse that taint.
was obtained
alleged

No intervening

Most of the State's physical evidence

in the storage unit search pursuant to Thurman's

consent.

All of the evidence and the consents were

17
obtained as a result of the pay envelope. X-T.he pay envelope is
inadmissible

due

to

the

officers'

unlawful

no-knock

entry.

Therefore, all evidence from the search/is inadmissible.
Respectfully submitted this

1/ 7

/

day of November, 1991.

ROBERT VAN SCIVER
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO.

vs.

911900907

STEVEN DOUGLAS THURMAN,
Defendant.

Defendant

Steven

Douglas

Thurman

has

moved

to

suppress

evidence resulting from searches conducted under a warrant and
written

consents.

Additionally,

he

statements he made during the searches.

seeks

to

suppress

Many of the pertinent

facts are uncontested but some are necessarily part of the fact
finding

duties

of

the

constitutes the necessary

court.

This

Memorandum

Decision

findings of fact and conclusions of

law.

I.
The defendant
related
caused

felonies.
the death

FACTS

is charged with
The
of Adam

a capital homicide and

Information

alleges

Cook by means

that

two

defendant

of a bomb which

was

STATE V. THURMAN
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detonated on the night of May 15, 1991. On the night following
the bombing

incident, U.S. Magistrate Ronald

warrant to search defendant's apartment.

Boyce

issued a

The application for

the search warrant requested authorization to enter defendant's
(nno-knockn entry) and at any

apartment without giving notice
time

of

the

day

or

night.

The

warrant

issued,

however,

restricted the search to the hours between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00
p.m.

and did not authorize a

f,

no-knockn entry.

The basis for the warrant was the affidavit of Roderic J.
Conner, a Special Agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco &
Firearms

("ATF").

All

the

information

contained

in

the

affidavit appears to have been developed in the days and hours
following the May 15 bombing.
Assuming

the accuracy

of

the Conner

affidavit

and the

hearsay statements therein, the following facts supporting the
issuance of a warrant were submitted to Magistrate Boyce:

A

bomb was placed in an automobile belonging to Howard Cook and
was detonated on May 15, 1991, injuring Mr. Cook's son, Adam.
Mr.

Cook had been having

wife, Wendy Thurman.
after

the

divorce.

Thurman

an affair with

defendant's

former

The affair spanned the period before and
divorce

but

was

not

the

cause

of the

As recent as May 13, Cook had spent the night at
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Wendy

Thurman's

residence.

The

defendant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

was

affair between Mr. Cook and his former wife.

aware

of the

The defendant

reported this affair to Mr. Cook's then wife and asked her if
she intended to allow Mr. Cook to continue to reside in the
Cook house.

While defendant had made no threats directly to

his former wife, on at least one occasion several months before
the bombing
hours

incident he sat in his car in the early morning

outside his

former

wife's

apartment

and

former wife and Mr. Cook returning from a date.

observed

his

Defendant had

expressed his anger toward and hatred for his former wife and
indicated he had hired a private investigator to watch her and
Mr. Cook.

On the morning of May 14, a male caller to Metz

Bakery, an establishment where both Mr. Cook and defendant's
former wife were employed, stated that there was a bomb in one
of

the

trucks.

The

Salt

Lake

investigated but found no bomb.

County

Sheriff's

Office

On the day of the bombing, May

15, Mr. Cook's automobile was parked in the Metz Bakery parking
lot from 6:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.

At the time of the bombing,

Mr. Cook's automobile was parked in front of the Richard Craig
residence located at 5740 South 665 West in Murray.

A neighbor

of the Craig's observed a small two-door vehicle leave the area
at a high rate of speed and with its lights out.

The Affidavit

STATE V. THURMAN
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does not, however, specify the date or time when the neighbor
made

this

Monza.
At

observation.

The

defendant

drives

a

Chevrolet

(Affidavit of Roderic J. Conner, paras. 2-4, 6-10, 12).
6:14

a.m.

on

May

17,

1991, the

day

following

the

issuance of the warrant and two days following the bombing,
seven law enforcement officers executed the warrant.

Six of

the officers forced their way into defendant's apartment with
weapons drawn less than 3 0 seconds after knocking.

The ATF

agent in charge of entry testified that the officers announced
their

identity

and

intent

simultaneously

with

their

entry.

Defendant was in bed, asleep, naked and offering no resistance
when he was subdued and handcuffed by the officers.
process, defendant
paramedics

on

was cut on the

the

scene.

The

nose

and

evidence

In the

attended

does

not

to by

indicate

whether the paramedics were summoned out of concern for the
officers7

liability

or

the

defendant's

well-being.

The

paramedics treated defendant and he was allowed to dress at
some

time

before

7:30

Defendant was initially

a.m.

and

perhaps

as

early

as

6:30.

informed of his rights in accordance

with the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
soon after the officers' entry but before he was treated by the
paramedics and allowed to dress.
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At 7:30 a.m. defendant signed two forms granting consent to
search two automobiles and a camper.

ATF Agent Robert Swehla

read the consent form verbatim to defendant.

As the search at

defendant's apartment proceeded, the officers became aware of a
storage unit which defendant rented.

At 7:40 a.m. defendant

signed another consent form authorizing a generalized search of
the

storage

unit.

Defendant

consents before signing.

fully

evidence

whether

an

the

three

His own testimony indicated that he

was not compelled or coerced to sign.
the

understood

officer

There is a conflict in

suggested

that

defendant's

failure to cooperate and sign the consent would not ultimately
prohibit

a

search.

The

court

specifically

finds

that

an

officer made that suggestion but that it was not Agent Swehla.
It was Swehla, however, who was in charge of acquiring these
consents.
75-85

It should be noted that the consents were signed

minutes

following

entry

and

after

defendant

dressed,

called his employer, was treated by the paramedics and informed
of his constitutional

right to counsel

and

right to remain

silent.
Between approximately 8:30 and 9:30 a.m., an officer again
informed defendant of his rights under the Miranda decision.
At 11:00 a.m. defendant accompanied the officers to the storage
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unit and the defendant again signed a general consent to search
the storage unit at 11:29 a.m.

ATF Agent Conner went over the

consent form with defendant point by point before he signed the
form.

Defendant understood the consent and testified himself

that his signature was not coerced.

He also understood that

the form was similar to that which he previously signed for
Agent Swehla.
While the search of the storage unit proceeded at about
12:30 or 1:00 p.m., ATF Agent Swehla invited defendant into a
mobile command unit to talk.

It was at this time defendant

made the statements which he now seeks to suppress.
was

not given

silent

or

any

right

further warnings

to

counsel.

Defendant

of his right to

Immediately

after

remain

making

the

subject statements, defendant did invoke his right to counsel.
The questioning then ceased.
Defendant was handcuffed

throughout the various

searches

with the exception of a total of 20 minutes to one hour at the
storage

unit

and

in

transit.

arrested until 2:30 p.m.

Defendant

was

not

formally

There can be no doubt, however, that

defendant was in custody since 6:14 a.m.
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II.

SEARCH WARRANT

This court's obligation in reviewing the search warrant is
merely

to

insure the Magistrate had an appropriate basis

for

determining that probable cause existed for the issuance of the
warrant.
great

In conducting

deference

to

this

the

review, the

Magistrate's

court

should

render

determination.

The

Magistrate's decision is not a theoretical or technical one but
instead a practical, common sense determination considering the
totality of the circumstances

specified

in the affidavit.

It

is the Magistrate's obligation to determine whether there is a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found
127,

at the
129

specified

(Utah

1987);

location.
State

v.

State
Miller,

v.

Hansen,

740

P.2d

732

P. 2d

1363,

1365

(Utah App. 1987); State v. Stromberq, 783 P.2d 54, 56, 57 (Utah
App.

1989).
In reviewing the affidavit presented

to Magistrate Boyce,

it can be fairly inferred that the defendant had a motivation
to harm Mr. Cook and had demonstrated

an intense

knowing Mr. Cook's comings and goings.

Mr. Cook's employer had

been

the

bombing
justify

subject
in

of

a bomb

question.

the Magistrate's

This

threat

just

information

determination

one
was

that

day

interest

before

sufficient

there was

in

the
to

a fair
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probability evidence of the crime could be located in defendant
Thurman's apartment.
Defendant's
based

on

a

affidavit
question

claim

is
of

challenge
that

stale.

to
the

Most

staleness

the

search

factual

all

approach

of

basis

the

it

warrant

in part

recited

cases

from

is

the

in

the

addressing

the

perspective

of

whether there is a sufficient showing that the evidence can
still be located at the site to be searched.

See, State v.

Hansen, supra; State v. Stromberq, supra; State v. Anderton,
668

P.2d

1258

(Utah

1983).

In

this

case,

however,

the

challenge of staleness is not directed at the fruits of the
search
search.

but

instead

at the underlying

justification

for the

Merely because much of the information recited in the

supporting affidavit disclosed matters occurring months before
is of no great significance.

Such facts were for the purpose

of showing that defendant had motive and opportunity to commit
the crime and that his apartment was thus an appropriate place
to search.

The alleged stale allegations were not for the

purpose of suggesting that evidence of the crime could still be
located at the apartment.
As noted, the allegedly stale facts were acted upon by law
enforcement

within

days

after

the

facts

came

to

their

attention.
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Moreover, law enforcement acted with some dispatch

after the May 15 bombing to effect the search.
issued

one

day

after

the

incident

and

The warrant was

executed

within

15

minutes of the earliest time authorized by the warrant itself.
The affidavit supporting the warrant suggested the likelihood
that

relevant

(Affidavit

evidence

of

Roderic

consequence, the

would
J.

alleged

still

Conner,

in

paras.

staleness

suggest the search would be

be

of

fruitless

the
14,

apartment.
16).

information

As

does

a
not

and does not thereby

undermine the probable cause upon which the warrant was based.
The propriety
offer

absolute

executed.
executed
Magistrate

The
as

if

Boyce

of the

sanctuary
evidence
it
did

was
not

search warrant, however, does not
for

the

manner

establishes
a

that

"no-knock"
authorize

in
the

warrant

such

which

it

was

warrant

was

even

a warrant.

though
As

a

practical matter, the officers made a mere perfunctory knock
and seconds later made a forced entry.

It was only upon entry

that the officers announced their identity and purpose.

There

was not only insufficient compliance with Section 77-23-10(1),
Utah

Code Ann., requiring

notice

of

authority

and purpose,

there was not even an attempt by the officers to announce their
identity and purpose before forcing entry.
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It appears that the officers took

it upon themselves to

execute the lawful warrant in an unlawful manner.
officers

may

Magistrate

well

Boyce

have

had

considered

concern
such

for

their

concerns

While the
own

expressed

safety,
in

the

affidavit of Agent Conner but rejected them by not authorizing
the requested "no-knock" warrant.

(Affidavit of Agent Conner,

paras. 17 and 18).
Having determined that the search warrant was lawful but
the manner of its execution unlawful, it is necessary for this
court

to determine

the consequences

of the

latter.

If the

search of the apartment pursuant to the warrant had produced
relevant evidence, one decision of the Utah Court of Appeals
would justify suppression of the evidence.
P. 2d 730 (Utah App. 1991).

State v. Rowe, 806

In this particular case, however,

the search of the apartment was fruitless.

Relevant evidence

was acquired only from a search of the storage area for which
there was a purported consent but no warrant.

This court then

must analyze the consequences of the unlawful execution of a
lawful search warrant in the context of the consents to search
the storage

area

rather than

issuance of the warrant itself.

in the

context

of the

lawful
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CONSENTS TO SEARCH

Because the evidence sought to be suppressed did not result
from the search authorized by the warrant, the State has the
burden

to prove

consents

to

by

clear

search which

and

convincing

yielded

knowingly and voluntarily granted.

the

evidence

subject

that

evidence

the
were

In determining whether the

State has met its burden, the court must consider generally the
totality of the circumstances and specifically certain factors
specified by the Utah Supreme Court.

State v. Whittenback, 621

P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980).
There can be little doubt that from the perspective of the
defendant, chaos reigned for about an hour following the forced
entry

by

six officers with guns drawn.

however, things began to calm.

Within

45 minutes,

By 7:00 or 7:15 a.m., almost an

hour had passed since the forced entry and defendant had been
treated

by

employer.

paramedics,

was

clothed

Agent

first consented

Swehla

defendant.

had

called

his

What is most persuasive, however, is the testimony

of both defendant and Agent Swehla.
defendant

and

read

an

Just ten minutes before

to a search

identical

of the storage unit,

consent

form

verbatim

to

The consent form is itself clear and unequivocal

and the court has found from the totality of the circumstances

that

defendant

testified
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understood

he was

not

the

coerced.

consent.
The

Defendant

court

concludes

himself
that

the

State has met its burden of proving that the first consent to
search the storage unit was knowingly and voluntarily granted.
In

drawing

totality

this

conclusion,

of the circumstances,

the

court

including

considered

the specific

the

factors

referenced in State v. Whittenback, the activities of the hour
preceding

the

consent

shackled defendant.

and

such

factors

as

a

continuously

Additionally, the statement of an officer

not directly involved in acquiring the consent suggesting that
a search was

inevitable

the consent.

This statement is but a piece of evidence to be

considered

in the

did not vitiate the voluntariness

totality.

Furthermore,

given

this

of

court's

review of Magistrate Boyce's search warrant, the statement was
true.

See State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d

1268, 1274, n.7

(Utah App.

1990).
The same factors and evidence apply to the second

consent

to search the storage unit which was granted at 11:29 a.m.
the

time

initial

of

the

second

consent,

however,

the

chaos

entry was over six hours distant, defendant

of
had

At
the
been

informed of his Miranda rights a second time and Agent Conner
reviewed

anew

each

item

on

the

consent

form.

The

court
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therefore concludes from a totality of the circumstances that
the State has met its burden of proof that the second consent
to

search

granted.

the

storage

The

court

unit

was

makes

knowingly

this

and

conclusion

voluntarily
after

fully

considering that the defendant was essentially shackled for six
hours at the time he signed the second consent form for the
storage unit.
The Utah Supreme Court decision in State v. Arroyo, 796
P.2d

684

whether

(Utah
either

1990),
consent

initial unlawful entry.

requires this court to also consider
was

obtained

by

exploitation

of the

The same evidence which persuaded this

court that each consent was knowingly and voluntarily granted
equally
officers

but
did

independently
not

exploit

persuades
the

initial

this

court

unlawful

that

entry.

the
The

circumstances and passage of time from the entry to the first
consent and the entry to the second consent purged each of the
consents from the taint of the unauthorized "no-knock" entry.
The officers did nothing to harken back to the entry and did
not make any further unnecessary show of force not otherwise
implicit by

their presence.

Focusing

solely

on the

second

consent to search the storage unit, the passage of time proved
to be the best antiseptic, cleansing the second consent of any
tadnt from the unlawful "no-knock" entry.
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DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS AND PROLONGED DETENTION

Defendant claims that he should have been given his Miranda
warnings
began

anew

about

just prior
12:30

or

to Agent

1:00

p.m.

Swehla's
Defendant

rights two times, the last occurring
the

questioning

These

but

warnings

that he

over

remained

interrupted

counsel.

two

hours

after

the questioning
the

told

which
of

four hours
the

initial

prominent
and

same

was

about

sufficiently

Furthermore,

questioning

invoked

evidence

to

his

before
entry.

defendant

his

right

supporting

to
the

voluntariness of the second consent to search the storage area
similarly establishes that defendant's statements were not the
product

of

concludes

the

that

initial,
the

State

unlawful
has

met

entry.

The

its burden

in

court

thus

establishing

that defendant's statements were knowingly and voluntarily made.
Defendant's
detention
court has
from

and

final

constituted
found
after

Correspondingly,

evidence

of

is

6:14
the

the

that

defendant's

an arrest without probable

that defendant

warrant was premised
that

claim

a.m.

was
he

court's

seized

was

cause.

in the

This

sense

that

not

free

to

leave.

determination

that

the

search

on facts establishing
crime

prolonged

would

be

found

a fair probability
necessarily

means
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that the officers had an articulable suspicion that defendant
was

responsible

justified
complete.

in

for

the

detaining

Defendant's

bombing.
defendant

The
until

pre-arrest

officers
all

detention,

were

thus

searches

were

then,

while

lengthy, was justified.

V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant's Motion to
is denied.
Dated this

4 ^ d a y of October, 1991.

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Suppress
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depose and say:
1.
I have been a Special Agent with ATF since September 24,
1989.
That as a result of my employment with ATF I have
successfully completed the required training courses at the Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. That during
my employment I am familiar with the Federal Firearms and Explosive
laws and have conducted prior investigations concluding in the
conviction of defendants. That prior to my employment with ATF I
was a police officer with the West Linn, Oregon, Police Department
for six and one half years.
2.
That on May 14, 1991, at about 8:20 a.m. Debbi Hale, a
receptionist at Metz Bakery, while at work received a "bomb threat"
telephone call in which the male caller said to "evacuate
immediately, there's a bomb in the back of one of the trucks, this
isn't a joke" and then hung up the phone.
Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Deputies assisted the Metz Bakery management by checking
the Metz premises. A bomb or explosive device was not discovered.
3.
That on May 15, 1991, at approximately 9:35 p.m. a pipe
bomb exploded inside a 1985 Toyota Landcruiser owned by Howard
Cook.
The vehicle was parked in front of the Richard Craig
residence, 5740 South 665 West, Murray, Utah. At the time of the
explosion the vehicle was occupied by the eleven year old son of
Howard Cook, Adam Cook. Adam Cook sustained serious injuries to
his head, in fact, a AA size battery was lodged behind Adam's eye
requiring emergency surgery to save his life*
4.
That on May 16, 1991, Detective Jeff Anderson (Murray,
Utah, Police Department) and I interviewed Howard Cook at the
University of Utah Hospital Emergency Room regarding the bombing.
Mr. Cook was asked about his day's activities and told his us his
schedule for May 15, 1991. Mr. Cook said that he went to work at
Metz Bakery at approximately 6:00 a.m. He was at work until 4:00
p.m. He believed that his car was locked and parked in the Metz
Bakery parking lot the entire day. After work, Mr. Cook said that
he went to his residence and worked in his yard until approximately
5:50 p.m.
At that time, Mr. Cook said that he went to his exwife's home (approx. 2700 East 4300 South) to pick up his two sons,
Geoffery and Adam, to spend the evening with him. After leaving
his ex-wife's home they went to Wendy's Hamburgers (approx. 5900
South State) and ordered their meal through the drive-up window.
Mr. Cook said that he then took Adam to Boy Scouts at Viewmont
Elementary School (approx 5700 South 720 West). Mr. Cook was asked
by the Scout Master to go down by the Jordan River to see if there
was another boy scout from the Troop that might have received wrong

information about the meeting. Mr. Cook and his son, Geoffery,
went down to the river but were unable to locate the other scout.
They then went to the Richard Craig residence (5740 South 665 West)
at approximately 7:30 p.m. as was his normal activity on Wednesday
nights while waiting for Adam to return from his Boy Scout meeting.
Mr. Cook said that he left the Landcruiser unlocked in from: of
the Craig residence and took the keys inside with him. Mr. Cook
said that he remained at the Craig's until Adam returned from Boy
Scouts. When Adam arrived at the Craig's, Mr. Cook and Geoffery
began to prepare to leave. While they were in the house Adam ran
out to the Landcruiser to wait for them. Mr. Cook was at the front
door when he saw Adam get in the front driver's side of the
vehicle. Mr. Cook said that he saw the driver's side door open,
a few seconds later he heard the horn and a "split second" later
the bomb exploded.
5.
Mr. Cook described the explosion by saying that he saw a bright white light and heard a "huge" explosion. He looked
outside and saw Adam hunched over the front seat of the vehicle.
6.
Mr. Cook was asked if_there_was anyonejwho_jwould„want^to
do him harm. Mr. Cook said that he had" been having an affair with
Wendy Thurman who worked with him at Metz' Bakery. Mr. Cook said
that he had continued his relationship with Wendy after she got a
divorce and had even spent the night of May 13, 1991, at Wendy's
residence. Mr. Cook said that Wendy's ex-husband, Steve Thurman,
knew of their affair; however, the affair was not the cause of the
divorce.
1.
Mr. Cook said that Steve Thurman drives an early 1980fs
Chevrolet Monza, cream or beige in color, with a square back. Jeff
Anderson conducted a search of the Utah Motor Vehicle Registration
record for Steve Thurman and found that he had registered a 1975
Chevrolet Monza with license plate # THURM.
8.
On May 16, 1991, Jeff Anderson and I interviewed Marian
Cook, Howard Cook's ex-wife. Ms. Cook said that the affair between
Howard and Wendy was a contributing factor to their divorce in
January. Ms. Cook said that she bacUbeen-called by Steve Thurman.
She said that Thurman had told her that Howard and Wendy were
having an affair and he wanted to know if Marian was going to kick
Howard out of the house.
9.
On May 16, 1991, Jeff Anderson and I interviewed Wendy
Thurman.
She said that Steve would not talk to her after the
divorce andLJjLa^not_made any threats against her. Wendy said that
she and Howard came to her house at about 1:30 a.m. after a date
several months ago and saw Steve Thurman in his car parked near the
apartment watching them.
Wendy said that Steve's father had
committed suicide several years ago and his mother had terminal
cancer. Wendy also said that Steve had been laid off from his job
at Hercules a few months ago and he was having problems finding a
job.

10. On May 16, 1991, Jeff Anderson and I interviewed Linda
Mae Bird, the Aunt of_Wendy Thunnan, who said that she had received
a telephone call from SJ^ye__Thunnan about six months_ago and he
told her he had hired a private investigator to watch Howard and
Wendy.
Mrs. Bird said that Steve was ^extremely angry at Wendy
because of the divorce and said that he hates Wendy for it. Mrs.
Bird said that Steve knew where Howard parked his Landcruiser when
he was visiting Wendy_at _her residence and he had photos of them
together.
11. On May 16, 1991, Jeff Anderson and I contacted the
managers office at the Tanglewood Apartments and determined that
Steve Thurman was renting their apartment at 3843 West 3500 South,
Apartment "H,f, and he had been the sole occupant of that apartment
since last year.
12. On May 16, 1991, Detective Hall of Murray, Utah Police
who told me that he interviewed Diane Burbidge who is a neighbor
of the Craig's.
She said that she saw a small 2 door vehicle
leaving the area Eastbound at a high rate of speed with its lights
out.
13. On May 16, 1991, Jerry Taylor, ATF Explosives Enforcement
Officer examined the remains of the device recovered from in and
around the Toyota Landcruiser and determined that the device
consisted of batteries, remote control receiver, a servo-mechanism
that was modified to serve as a switch, a cardboard box which
concealed a pipe bomb that was wrapped with nails.
14. Based on my experience, knowledge, and training, I have
found that individuals that manufacture and or position improvised
bombs have these components and materials to construct improvised
bombs in their residence, vehicles, workshops, or garage.
The
materials include: receipts for bomb components, actual components
such as batteries, explosives, pipe bomb parts, tape, books, video
tapes or manuals describing the assembly of improvised bombs, tools
used to manufacture improvised bombs, and items described in
paragraph 13 of this affidavit.
15. Based on my experience, knowledge, and training, I have
reason to believe that Steve Thurman has and is currently violating
firearms laws, to wit: 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) POSSESSION OF
UNREGISTERED DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES, and these offenses have been and
are being committed on the property and dwelling specifically
described as 3843 Rockwood Way #H, West Valley City/ Utah, and
within the Central Division of the District of Utah, and in a
vehicle registered to Steve Thurman which is described as a 1975
Chevrolet Honza, Utah license #THURM.
16. Also based upon my experience, knowledge, and training,
I have reason to believe that on the property described in
paragraphs 13 and 14 of this affidavit there will be found property
that constitutes evidence or commission of a crime; fruits of crime
or things otherwise criminally possessed; property designed or

intended for use or which is or has been used as a means of
committing a criminal offense, to wit: items mentioned in
paragraphs 13 and 14 of this affidavit.
17. Also based upon my experience, knowledge, and training,
those individuals required to execute a warrant involving the
search of explosives and their precursor materials will be in
danger if Agents and Officers are required to announce their
authority and purpose before executing this warrant as required by
18 U.S.C. § 3109. Authority is therefore sought from this Court
to break open any outer or inner doors or windows without giving
notice of authority on the properties described in paragraph 15 of
this affidavit in order to execute this search warrant.
18. Finally, based upon my experience, knowledge, and
training, the materials are hazardous to_public^safety, a threat
to residents in the adjoining area, and the possibility that the
suspect has animosity towards other victims possibly designated as
targets of additional bombings. Authority is therefore sought from
this Court to execute this warrant at any time in the day or night.
DATED this

day of May, 1991.

Roderic J. Conner, Special Agent
BATF
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS

RONALD N. BOYCE
United States Magistrate Judge

APPROVED:
MARK K. VINCENT, Special
Assistant U.S. Attorney

day of May, 1991.
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In the Matter of the Search of
(Nam«„ addfMt or tynmi d*»cnotion of person or pfooerty to o« s««rcr>«3J

The property of 3843 West 3500 South #H
SEARCH
West Val.lev City, Utah. and
The propertv of a 1975 Chevrolet Monza CASE NUMBER:
with Utah license plate #Thurm.

TO:

Rndp.ric J, Conner

WARRANT

. and any Authorized Officer of the United States

Affidavit(s) having been made before me by

g A

Ropdcr^c

believe that Q on the person of or Q on the premises known as

J.

Conner

who has reason to

(name, description ana/or location)

3843 West 3500 South #H
West Valley Citv, Utah
and
1975 Chevrolet Monza with Utah license #THURM.
U T A H
CENTRAL D I V I S I O N
District of
in the.
concealed a certain person or property, namely (describe the oerson Cr orooeny)

.there is now

See Attachment "A", which is attached hereto and incorporated herein bv ret

I am satisfied that the affidavit(s) and any recorded testimony establish probable cause to believe that the persor
or property so described is now concealed on the person or premises above-described and establish grounds for
/ t h e issuance of this warrant.
/?
' YOU ARE HEHE3Y COMMANDED to search on or before.

Mav 2 3 ,

1991
Date

/ (not to exceed 10 days) the person or place named above for the person or property specified, serving this warrant
\ and making the search x x ^ ^ X S X ? ^
(at any time in the day or night as I find
reasonaole cause has been established) and if the person or property be found there to seize same, leaving a copy
of this warrant and receipt for the person or property taken, and prepare a written inventory of the person or proo
A erty seized and promptly return this warrant to
RONALD N . BOYCE
US JuOQeor Magistrate
as required by law.
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ATTACHMENT A

Explosive materials, that is, gunpowder, model rocket igniters or
motors, and commercial packaging for the explosive materials. Receipts
or other documents related to the purchase of the explosive materials;
tools, pipe nipples, pipe end caps, electrical wiring and connectors,
packaging or duct tape and sundry items used in the fabrication of a
destructive device.

Bomb components to include batteries, switches,

remote control receiver and transmitter, servo mechanism, nails,
cardboard box and receipts for these items. Drawings, books, manuals,
video tapes, diagrams or other forms of instructions relating to the
fabrication of destructive devices. Photographs of destructive devices,
their components, and the process involved in the manufacture of bombs.
Equipment to be used for the manufacturing of components for destructive
devices.

Partially assembled or assembled destructive devices. Any

documentation or information pertaining to the storage, possession,
and/or manufacturing of destructive devices.

